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"FAIR AND EQUITABLE" PLAN

Should the words "fair and equitable" in section I I ( e) of the Holding
Company Act 1 be construed differently than the same words in section
77B of the Bankruptcy Act? 2 The Securities and Exchange Commission faced this question in disposing of a proposed plan of merger involving Utility Operators Company and subsidiaries. A divided commission gave an affirmative answer 8 to the above question, holding
"fair and equitable" in the Holding Company Act to permit relative
priority. This holding merits particular interest since the United States
Supreme Court has held the same words as used in section 77B permitted only absolute priority/ The doctrine of absolute priority in
effect comes down to this: no junior class of security holders may
participate in the reorganized corporation unless all senior security
holders are fully compensated.5 That rule, firmly fixed in proceedings
1

Public Utility Holding Company Act, 49 Stat. L. 822, § II (1935), 15
U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 79 I.
2
Bankruptcy Act, 48 Stat. L. 912, § 77B (1934), II U. S. C. (1935), § 207.
8
Matter of Federal Water Service Corp., S. E. C., Holding Company Act Release No. 2635 (1941).
4. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106, 60 S. Ct. l (1939).
The decision in the Los Angeles case rested on the Court's construction of the
words "fair and equitable" as used in section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act. A construction
of those words in the statute was made necessary in order that the Court might determine the conditions under which stockholders of the insolvent debtor corporation
could participate in a plan of reorganization under section 77 B of the Bankruptcy Act.
It was held that the plan did not recognize the "equitable right" of the bondholders to
be preferred to stockholders against the full value of all property belonging to the
debtor corporation, since the full value of that property was not first applied to claims
of the bondholders before the stockholders were allowed to participate.
The Los Angeles Lumber Products case is discussed in the following: 28 CAL.
L. REV. 633 (1940); 8 GEo. WASH. L. REv. II07 (1940); Calkins, "Valuation in
Corporate Reorganization," 16 NOTRE DAME LAWY. 18 (1940); 7 UNIV. CHI. L.
REv. 549 ( 1940); Swanstrom, "Stockholders' Participation in Reorganization," 28
GEo. L. J. 336 (1939); Dodd, "The Los Angeles Lumber Products Company Case
and its Implications," 53 HARV. L. REv. 713 (1940); 34 ILL. L. REv. 589 (1940);
38 MicH. L. REv. 695 (1940); 17 N. Y. UNIV. L. Q. REv. 287 (1940); 13 So.
CAL. L. REv. 349 (1940); 25 WASH. UNiv. L. Q. REv. 279 (1940); 49 YALE L. J.
1099 (1940).
5
Northern Pacific Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482, 33 S. Ct. 554 (1913). The
Boyd case involved equity reorganization. Boyd recovered a judgment against the
Coeur D'Alene Railroad and Navigation Company. Prior to the date of the judgment,
the properties of the Coeur D'Alene Company had been absorbed by the Northern
Pacific Railroad Company, which in turn had been reorganized into the Northern
Pacific Railway Company. The latter was held liable to Boyd for the amount of the
judgment he held. The Court stated that the transfer of the debtor's property without
first paying the creditors of the Coeur D'Alene Company was a fraud on the creditors
and that creditors had to be compensated in full before a security holder of the debtor
corporation could participate in the reorganized company.
For further discussion of the priority problem, see: Case v. Los Angeles Lumber
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both in equity reorganization and under the Bankruptcy Act, was rejected by the Securities and Exchange Commission, Commissioner Healy
dissenting, in the application of the Holding Company Act to the situation presented in the case of Utility Operators Company and subsidiaries.
The commission was confronted with the priority question in connection with a proposed merger 0 involving Federal Water Service
Corporation (hereinafter called "Federal"), Utility Operators Company, the parent of Federal, and Federal Water and Gas Corporation,
a wholly-owned subsidiary of Federal. Utility Operators Company is
but a holding company.7 Federal Water and Gas Company never
actively engaged in business. Federal owned its outstanding securities,
consisting of ten shares of common stock, $100 par.8 Federal is solely
a holding company, having a controlling interest in various subsidiaries
rendering utility service in thirteen states. Its outstanding securities
consist of debentures, preferred stock, Class A common stock and Class
B common stock. Even on the basis of asset values as shown on the
books, which the management admits are excessive,9 Federal has a
capital surplus 10 deficit of $3,848,865. In addition there exists an
Products Co., 308 U. S. 106, 60 S. Ct. l (1939); Consolidated Rock Products Co.
v. Du Bois, 312 U. S. 510, 61 S. Ct. 675 (1941); In re Utilities Power & Light
Corp., (D. C. Ill. 1939) 29 F. Supp. 763, appeal dismissed (C. C. A. 7th, 1940)
not reported; FINLETTER, BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION 417-418 (1939); 2
GERDES, CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS § 1082 (1936); TRACY, CORPORATE FORECLOSURES § 294 (1929); Swaine, "Reorganization-The Next Step: A Reply to Mr.
James N. Rosenberg," 22 CoL. L. REv. 121 (1922).
6
The applicants filed the plan under section 7 of the act. The commission held
that the standard "detrimental to the interests of investors" contained in section 7
is not identical with the standard of "fair and equitable," set out in section 1 I ( e).
However, it was stated that the plan must be considered in the light of section l l ( e).
Prior decisions of the commission indicate that the test "detrimental to the
interest of investors" involves consideration of the question whether the terms of the
proposed plan are within the permissible limits of bargaining indicated by the rights
and priorities of the various classes of security holders. Applying this test to the proposed merger, it was held an allocation of new common stock to the A stockholders w~
proper.
7
Utility Operators Company owns the entire amount of Federal's Class B common stock, 6,536 shares of the same company's preferred stock, $3,000 of its debentures, and $600 of miscellaneous assets. These are the only assets held by the company. The company is not indebted.
8 Federal Water and Gas Company is not registered under the act, but being a
subsidiary of a registered holding company, it is subject to the act in certain respects.
9 The proposed plan of merger provides for the scaling down of assets to a figure
regarded as reasonable as of the date of merger, and the writing off of certain intangible
assets, e.g., "commission on capital stock" and "organization expense."
10
Under the head of "capital surplus" are variously included such increments of
net worth as paid-in surplus, whether paid in at organization or subsequent to organization on the basis of favorable operations, revaluation credits, surplus from donations of
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earned surplus 11 deficit of $3,865,070. Under normal conditions the
entire voting power of the company resides in the holders of the Class
B stock. However, the preferred and Class A stocks, due to dividend
arrearages, now carry with them a majority of the voting rights. Class
B stockholders still possess 42.73% of the voting power even though
the entire book value of the B stock is wiped out due to the large capital deficit.
The primary purposes and reasons for reorganizations in the principal case are as follows: (a) removal of deficits, for during the time
they impair the capital represented by stock having a preference on
the distribution of assets,12 the paying of dividends on any class of
stock will be illegal under the Delaware law; 18 (b) scaling down of
assets; ( c) removal of heavy dividend arrearages on the preferred and
Class A stocks by issuing new common stock of the reorganized company in turn for a surrender of past dividend rights; (d) compliance
with section I I (b) ( 2) of the Holding Company Act 14 by simplification of the structure of the holding company system.
stock and property assessments, and gains from the favorable reacquisition or disposition
of a company's own stock or obligations. Variations in practice exist as to the inclusion
of these unrelated items under the single caption "capital surplus." PATON, AccouNTANTS' HANDBOOK, 2d ed., 965 (1936).
11 " 'Earned Surplus' is the balance of the net profits, net income, and gains of a
corporation after deducting losses and after deducting distributions to stockholders and
transfers to capital-stock account." PATON, AccouNTANTS' HANDBOOK, 2d ed., 966
(1936).
12
The preferred stock of Federal entitles the holder thereof to an involuntary
liquidating value of $ 100 per share plus accrued dividends, except the $4 series, whose
involuntary liquidating value is $62.50 per share plus accrued dividends. Voluntary
liquidated value is $1 IO per share plus accrued dividends for all classes of preferred
except the $4 series, which has a voluntary liquidating preference of $68.75 plus
accrued and unpaid dividends.
Upon liquidation, Class A stock is entitled, subject to prior rights of the preferred stock, to $ 50 per share plus accumulated dividends, any remaining assets to be
shared equally with Class B stock.
18
Del. Code (1935), c. 65, § 34.
H Section 11 (b) ( 2) requires the commission to make such orders as are necessary to insure (a) that the corporate structure of each registered holding company and
its subsidiaries does not inequitably and unfairly distribute voting power among its
security holders, and (b) that its corporate structure does not unduly or unnecessarily
complicate the structure of the holding company system.
The commission held that the voting power still retained by the Class B stockholders was clearly unfair and inequitable due to the fact that the capital deficit wipes
out in full the book value of the B stock. It further held that Federal's deficits, its
inability to pay dividends, and the large arrearages present complexities that clearly
violate the act. The commission concluded that, due to the inconsistencies existing
between the act and Federal's existing condition, Federal was faced with compulsory
simplification under the above section of the act unless it could alter its corporate
structure by some other method.
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The proposed plan of merger provided for the issuance of new
common stock at a par value of $12 per share.15 The problem of prime
significance confronting the commission and of sole importance for the
purpose of the present discussion is the proper allocation of this new
common stock among the various security holders of Federal. The
majority of the commission approved the provision in the plan allocating 5.38% of the new common stock to the present holders of the
Class A stock, the remaining 94.62 % going to the preferred stock.16
The question of priorities in reorganization under the Holding Company Act is thus squarely raised, for due to the large deficits on Federal's books there was no book value for the Class A stock.11

15
The comm1ss1on refused to approve the plan's prov1S1on for a new common
stock of $12 per share par value. The refusal was based upon future financing difficulties attaching to a $1 2 par stock, due to the fact that Federal's past business experience and prospective earnings caused the commission to believe, and rightly so, that
the stock could not be sold in the market for its par value. This factor no doubt would
cause future financing difficulties due to the existence of a Delaware law to the effect
that sto::k may not be sold as fully paid at a price below its par.
16
The management of Federal purchased a considerable amount of preferred
stock, at low prices, during the period in which the reorganization plan was being
discussed and formulated. There was no evidence to show that the management acted
with malevolent intent or in bad faith. Under the proposed plan, the shares so purchased would share in the plan on a parity with all other preferred stock of the same
series. The commission held, however, that such a provision in the plan was detrimental to the interests of investors, unfair, and inequitable. The basis for such a conclusion was that the directors and officers of a corporation are fiduciaries and should
not trade in the securities of that corporation during the process of formulation of a
plan for reorganization of the company.
Upon refusal to approve the provision in the proposed plan relating to preferred
stock so purchased by the management, the commission did not indicate definitely what
the treatment in the plan of such stock should be. However, it was suggested that a
formula should be devised which would limit the participation of such sto::k to an
amount which takes into account the purchase prices paid, plus the accumulated ·dividends since the dates of the respective purchases.
The enforcement of the fiduciary obligations of officers and directors in similar
fact situations is again stressed by the commission in Matter of Derby Gas & Electric
Corp., S. E. C., Holding Company Act Release No. 2875 (July 12, 1941).
17
The large deficits and the financial condition of Federal in general necessarily
led the commission to conclude that the book value of the Class B stock had been wiped
out and that said stock had no basis on the facts present to claim an interest in prospective earnings. For like reasons the commission refused to approve a provision in the
plan providing for a "staggered board" of directors whereby the Class B stockholders
would have a majority representation on the board of directors of the reorganized
company for a period of two years. In the words of the commission: "The exaction of
retention of control for almost two years ••• cannot be regarded as within the permissible limits of bargaining, because the Class B stockholders have nothing of value
to bargain with. Under the circumstances, the proposed continuation of the Class B
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Was the commission correct in finding under the statutory formula
of "fair and equitable" an equity in the Class A stock, based on prospective earnings, which would entitle it to participate in the reorganized
company?
It is conceded that the conclusion of the commission is a justifiable
one if the words "fair and equitable" in section I I ( e) of the Holding
Company Act call for the application of the doctrine of relative priority.
However, should the words "fair and equitable" in section I I ( e)
be construed differently than the same words as used in section 77B of
the Bankruptcy Act? It is submitted that the answer should be in
the negative.
The United States Supreme Court in interpreting the words "fair
and equitable" in the Bankruptcy Act has consistently held that such
a statutory formula sets up the rule of absolute priority.18 Undoubtedly
the Supreme Court in reaching such a conclusion attempted to determine the particular meaning which Congress attached to these significant words. Prior to the Bankruptcy Act of 1934 the courts had
been called up to declare the principle which should govern in the
treatment of the various equities in corporate reorganization. The
cardinal principle which was enunciated by the Supreme Court was that
of absolute priority. At the time of the adoption of the Bankruptcy Act
it had become settled law in equity reorganization that the Court would
insist on the application of the principle of absolute priority. 19 The
language of the Bankruptcy Act did not indicate that Congress intended to supplant the "fixed principle" of the Boyd case. Therefore
the Court's construction of the words "fair and equitable" in section
77B of the Bankruptcy Act appears to be a most reasonable one.20
stock's control of the board is both detrimental to the interest of the senior investors and
results in an unfair and inequitable distribution of voting power."
The plan of merger did not provide for an allocation of new common stock
to the Class B stockholders of Federal, the plan stating that Class B stock was to be
surrendered and cancelled.
18
Consolidated Ro::k Products Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 61 S. Ct. 675
(1941); Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U. S. 106, 60 S. Ct. I
(1939); FINLETTER, BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION 417-418 (1939).
19
Northern Pacific Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 33 S. Ct. 554 (1913); Rosenberg, "Reorganization-The Next Step," 22 Cot. L. REv. 14 (1922); 2 GERDES,
CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS § 1082 (1936); TRACY, CORPORATE FORECLOSURES
§ 294 (1929).
20
Section 221 of Chapter X (Corporate Reorganization) of the Chandler Act
has incorporated the provisions of 77B. Four other sections in different phases of the
Chandler Act use the expression, "fair and equitable"; viz.: section 3 36 of Chapter XI
(Arrangements), section 472 of Chapter XII (Real Property Arrangements by Persons
other than Corporations), section 656 of Chapter XIII (Wage Earners' Plans), section
725 of Chapter XV (Railroad Adjustments).
In the case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. United States Realty
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Likewise in interpreting the meaning of the standard "fair and
equitable" set up in section· II (b) ( 2), we should view the picture
as it appeared to Congress when those words were made a part of the
statute. As we have seen, prior to the enactment of the Holding Company Act of 1935 the words "fair and equitable" had attained a :fixed
and definite meaning in the :field of judicial construction. It surely is
not a misstatement to say that Congress and the Congressional committees at the time of the adoption of the Holding Company Act were
fully aware of the :fixed meaning which had become attached to the
words "fair and equitable." Yet there is nothing in the act itself, in the
Congressional Record or in the Committee Reports 21 which supports
the contention that Congress intended the words "fair and equitable"
to be used in any other sense. In fact, a view of the history of the bill 22
which culminated in the legislative enactment of the Holding Company Act indicates the contrary. The words were deliberately used
without qualification; their meaning was apparently not contested or
questioned in Congressional discussions leading up to the enactment of
the Holding Company Act in its present form. Had Congress intended
to attribute a new meaning to the words "fair and equitable" it could
easily have so stated.
The majority of the commission stated that if it had seen :fit to
require liquidation, under the powers given it in section I I (b), the
principle of absolute priority would apply. The protection accorded
the rights of the various classes of security holders should not be
widely varied, in the absence of substantial reasons for so doing, solely
because of the particular remedial action taken by the commission under
the Holding Company Act. The fact remains that the corporate structure of Federal did conflict with the provisions and purposes of the
act. 23 As a result the commission, under section II (b), had the power
to take corrective action. To deny application of the doctrine of absolute priority, because an order calling for liquidation of Federal was
:& Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434 at 452, 60 S. Ct. 1044 (1940), the Court said:

·" 'Fair and equitable,' taken from § 77B and made the condition of confirmation under
'both Chapter X or Chapter XI are 'words of art' having a well understood meaning in
:reorganizations in equitable receiverships and under section 77 B which is incorporated
in the structure of both Chapters X and XI." The Court added that the plan or
irrangement must conform to the rule of the Boyd and Los Angeles cases. The Court
made it very clear that the words "fair and equitable" in Chapters X and XI are to be
construed in the light of the Boyd case.
21
S. REP. 621, parts I and 2, 74th Cong., 1st sess. (1935); H. REP. 1318,
parts I and 2, 74th Cong., 1st sess. (1935); H. REP. 1903, 74th Cong., 1st sess.
(1935).
22
S. Bill 2796, 74th Cong., 1st sess. (1935).
23 See supra, note 14.
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not required, is to vary the well established construction of "fair and
equitable" without a sound reason.
The presence of imminent liquidation is not the basis of the principle announced in the Boyd case and reaffirmed in the Los Angeles
and Consolidated Rock cases.24 The doctrine of absolute or strict priority is founded on proper recognition of contractual rights.25 The
priority rights inhere in the contractual relationship between the parties
involved and should not be made to depend on such extraneous facts
as the presence or absence of imminent liquidation.

24 While these cases involved corporations insolvent in the bankruptcy sense, the
Supreme Court in affirming the doctrine of absolute priority in the Consolidated Rock
case stated that the doctrine applied "whether a company is solvent or insolvent in
either the equity or bankruptcy sense." Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du Bois, 3 I 2
U.S. 510 at 527, 61 S. Ct. 675 (1941).
25 Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U. S. 510, 61 S. Ct. 675
(1941); Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U. S. 106, 60 S. Ct. I
(1939); Northern Pacific Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 33 S. Ct. 554 (1913).

